SUPPORTING BRIEF #2: INCOME TAX, AS IMPOSED UPON LABOR, IS VOID FORVAGUENESS AND DEVOID OF ANY VOLUNTARY NATURE, Page 4
**********************************************************************
This research of cases also shows that the constitutionality of a direct tax being imposed upon labor has not been ruled upon by the Supreme Court. This will become clear when the Cheek v. U.S. case (1990 term) is addressed.
The objects of taxation pursuant to the 16th Amendment and the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of 1913 are brought forward in two other Supreme Court cases. The first case is Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 US 170. In this case Mr. Justice Butler stated:
"It was not the purpose or the effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had the power to tax all incomes (gains and profits). But taxes on incomes from some sources had been held to be "direct taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to apportionment. The Amendment relieved from that requirement and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that are direct taxes and those that are not, and so put on the same basis all incomes "from whatever source derived". "Income" has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909 (36 Stat. 112), in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed." Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 US 170, 46 S. Ct. Rptr. at page 451. (Parenthesis added)
Hence, the Court in Bowers indicated that the nature of the taxation pursuant to the 16th Amendment was the same as the nature of the taxation pursuant to the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909. The Supreme Court in the case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 US 107, clearly spelled out the objects of taxation pursuant to the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909. This case brought out that the form of taxation in question was an excise tax upon the doing of business in a corporate or quasi-corporate capacity.
Internal Revenue (§ 9*)- Federal Corporation Tax- Excise or Direct tax.
2. An excise upon the carrying on or the doing of business in a corporate or quasi-corporate capacity is what was imposed by the act of August 5, 1909 (Stat. at L. 1st Sess. 61st Cong. pp. 11-112-117, chap. 6, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, pp. 659-844-849), § 38, providing that insurance companies and all corporations, joint stock companies, or associations organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares, shall be subject annually to a special excise tax with the respect to the carrying on or doing business, equivalent to 1 per centum upon the entire net income over and above $5,000 received from all sources during the year, with certain allowances and deductions. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 US 107, 31 S. Ct. Rptr. at page 343.
If the "income tax" is in its nature an excise, how can such a tax be imposed directly upon labor? Is it to be claimed that the labor of the people is a corporate or quasi-corporate activity? Are the exercise of rights secured by the Constitution to be deemed as "doing business in a corporate or quasi-corporate capacity"? If this be the case, then the Bill of Rights is void. The people have been duped into believing that they have constitutionally guaranteed rights, when, in fact, there are no rights at all, but merely privileges granted by the government, and those privileges are granted under the complete and unrestrained power of the government. This is not freedom but, in light of a better term, quasi-slavery.
Omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi. All men are freemen or slaves.
In maxima potentia minima licentia. In the greatest power there is the least liberty. Hob. 159.
Inde datæ leges ne fortior omnia posset. Laws were made lest the stronger should have unlimited power.
Quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum liberatem respondendum erit. Whenever there is a doubt between liberty and slavery, the decision must be in favor of liberty. Dig. 50. 17. 20.
The only case that this researcher found that addressed the issue of the "income tax" being directly imposed upon labor was Cheek v. U.S., 498 US 192. This case involved an airline pilot that stopped filing "income tax" returns and believed that, the "income tax", as applied to him, was unconstitutional. Reading the case shows that he objected to a tax being imposed upon his wages. This researcher can find nothing in the Cheek case that indicates there is a "voluntary" nature to the "income tax" being imposed upon labor.
There is no doubt in this researcher's mind that if such a case came before the Supreme Court in the days of the Pollock Court or the Brushaber Court, all the Court would have done was take judicial notice the fact that a tax was being levied directly upon Mr. Cheek's labor and would have struck such a tax down in such strong terms as to firmly establish the matter for all time (res judicata). The Court in Cheek however, did not address Cheek's constitutional claims but reversed his conviction on statutory grounds.
"It is common ground that this Court, whenever possible, interprets congressional enactments so as to avoid serious constitutional questions." Cheek v. U.S., 498 US 192, 111 S. 	Ct. Rptr. at page 611.
Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file an income tax return in violation of § 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes in violation of § 7201. Cheek was convicted in the Federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
An examination of § 7203 ans § 7201 in the Internal Revenue Code shows that, for any criminal charges pursuant to these sections to be valid, the person in question must have a tax on him/her imposed by the Code. Consider the opening sentence in § 7201:
"Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title....."
and § 7203:
"Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return....."
Hence the question: What kinds of "persons" are these two sections referring to? It does not say that "every person is required", but rather, "any person required". Therefore each individual must make a determination if Title 26 USC imposes a legal duty on him/her.
In subchapter A, part 1 of the IR Code we find the sections dealing with "Tax on Individuals". Section 1 (a) thru (d) deals with the individual. However, nowhere does these sections shed any light on whether or not the individual's labor is a taxable object. These sections all say that "There is hereby imposed upon the taxable income...". So we go to section 2 where we find the definitions. Nowhere in the definitions do we find that labor comes within the scope of "taxable income". In fact, there is no definition of what income is. So the individual is left completely in the dark as to whether or not the IR Code imposes a tax on his/her labor.
Ubi non adest norma legis, omnia quasi pro suspectis habenda sunt. When the law fails to serve as a rule, almost everything ought to be suspected. Bacon, Aph. 25.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such a construction is to be made that the subject may have an effect rather than none. Broom, Max. 543; Jenk. Cent. 198; 78 Pa. 219.
If we examine the legal definition of the word "labor" in Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed., we see that "labor" and "wages" are synonymous terms.
Chapter 24 of the IR Code has the following heading: "Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages". This heading clearly shows that "wages" are the source of the "income". It does not say that wages are income. It can therefore be deduced that "labor" and "income" are not synonymous terms. Section 3401 defines the word "wages", but nowhere in the definition does it refer to "wages" as "income". It is ironic that the entire Internal Revenue Code deals with the "income tax", but nowhere in the IR Code is the word "income" given a clear and concise definition. This being the case, how can any individual be expected to know if the IR Code applies to him/her?
Verba ordinationis quando verificari possunt in sua vera significatione, trahi ad extraneum intellectum non debent. When the words of an ordinance can be made true in their true signification, they ought not to be warped to a foreign meaning. Calvinus, Lex.
Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi. Suppression of the truth is (equivalent to) the expression of what is false. 23 Barb. 521, 525.
In the case of Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 US 170, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what this illusive word "income" means.
"After full consideration, this court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital." Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 US 170, 46 S. Ct. Rptr. at page 451. (emphasis added)
Noscitur a sociis. It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. Broom, Max. 588; 9 East. 267; 6 Taunt. 294; 1 B. & C. 644; 18 C.B. 102, 893; 5 M. & G. 639, 667; 3 C.B. 437; 5 id. 380; 4 Exch. 511, 519; 5 id. 294; 11 id. 113; 3 Term 87; 12 Allen 17; 105 Mass. 433; 1 N.Y. 47, 69; 11 Barb.43, 63; 20 id. 644; 38 Minn. 366; 166 U.S. 1; 67 Ill. App. 665.
Nigrum nunquam excedere debet rubrum. The black should never go beyond the red (i.e. the text of a statute should never be read in a sense more comprehensive than the rubric, or title). Trayner, Max. 373.
In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189, the Court not only ruled that "income" is a "gain" or "profit", but ruled that Congress may not alter the definition of a word to alter the Constitution. This is only logical, for if the definition of the word "income" was left to the total discretion of Congress, then they could apply the word to anything they desired to tax, including human labor.
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited form article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income', as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within those limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189, 40 S. Ct. Rptr. at page 193.
In studying this case, it evident that the Court saw that Congress was attempting to expand its taxing power beyond its constitutional boundaries by virtue of the 16th Amendment. The Court again had to reassert that the 16th Amendment granted no new taxing power.
"As we have repeatedly held, this did not extent the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income." supra, page 193.
The Court saw fit to define the term "income" in the strongest terms it could to try and resolve the matter, thus making it res judicata.
Interest reipublicæ res judicatas non rescindi. It concerns the commonwealth that things adjudged be not rescinded. See Res Judicata.
"For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income', as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgement as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue." supra, at page 193.
In this case, the tax in question was on a stock dividend. This researcher wonders how this particular Court would have reacted to a tax directly imposed upon labor. The Court then went on further to define the term "income".
"After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 ..... "'Income' may be defined as the gain derived from capitol, from labor, or from both combined', provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle case ..... Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution to the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis on the word 'gain', which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived - from - capital'; 'the gain - derived - from - capital', etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived' - that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal - that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.
"The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the Sixteenth Amendment - 'incomes, fromwhatever source derived' - the essential thought being with a conciseness and lucidity entirely in harmony with the form and style of the Constitution. supra, at page 193.